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ABSTRACT 
A Linear Quadratic Deterministic Continuous Time Game with many symmetric players is considered and the 
Linear Feedback Nash strategies are studied as the number of players goes to infinity. We show that under some 
conditions the limit of the solutions exists and can be used to approximate the case with a finite but large number of 
players. It is shown that in the limit each player acts as if he were faced with one player only, who represents the 
average behavior of the others.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In most papers in game theory there may be few or many players and solutions and properties are usually studied 
for a fixed such number. There are also papers where the multitude of players is infinite see Refs.8, 9 as well as 
many recent papers on games played by an infinite number of automata each one of which interacts with a finite 
number of neighbors. In the recent literature of mean field games (Refs. 10-16), stochastic games are considered 
with an infinite number of players who are modeled in a statistical sense. There are also papers where a version of 
the problem is solved for a finite number of players and the validity or evolution of some property is studied as the 
number of players goes to infinity (Refs. 5-7).The present paper belongs to this last category. We consider a finite 
number of players involved in a Linear Quadratic, deterministic, continuous time, infinite horizon Nash Game. To 
each one corresponds his control and a part of the overall state called his state. The game is symmetric in the sense 
that the evolution of the part of the state that pertains to each player is influenced in a symmetric manner by the 
controls and states of the others. Finally the cost of each player depends only on his state and control and it is also 
symmetric for all the players. We employ the Linear Feedback Nash equilibrium concept and study how the 
solutions change as the number of players goes to infinity. It should be noticed that the present work is related to 
recent work on mean field games, Refs. 12-14, and in particular 15 and 16, but there are essential differences. First 
of all our problem is deterministic whereas those in Refs. 15 and 16 are stochastic. In Ref.15, Nash Open Loop 
finite time horizon solutions are studied for stochastic LQ Games, whereas we consider Linear Feedback Nash 
Solutions for the infinite time horizon that satisfy the Principle of Dynamic Programming. Also Ref.16 considers 
for a stochastic LQ game the Nash Linear Feedback solution like we do, but there the scalar case is considered only 
whereas we consider the deterministic set up for the matrix case. For the particular structure of game chosen, we 
show that the limit exists and can be used to approximate the case where the number of players is very large. The 
conditions for this to happen are related to the existence and properties of solutions of a generalized Ricatti 
equation, which yields stabilizing solutions for the overall game. The study of an associated not standard 
Hamiltonian problem is shown to be crucial for the whole analysis .The resulting infinite number of players case 
shows that under some conditions, each player essentially acts as if he were faced with one fictitious player who 
represents the average behavior of all the others or the market as a whole. 
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
 
 
Let us consider a dynamical system with state 1 2( , ,... )Mx x x x= . Each nix R∈  evolves as  
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2( ... ) ( ... )i i M i M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                      (1) 
where miu R∈ is the control of the i-th player. We have 2M ≥  players and as the state equation shows we can think 
of ix as the part of the state, or subsystem, which pertains to the player i.  
The cost of the i-th player is given by: 
0
1 ( )
2
T T
i i i i iJ x Qx u u dt
∞
= +∫                                                                                                                                     (2)                                                                 
The matrices 1 2 1 2( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), 0TA n n A n n B n m B n m Q m m Q Q× × × × × = ≥  are real and constant. All the ix ’s have 
the same dimension. Similarly all the iu ’s have the same dimension. Notice that all the subsystems have the same 
1 2 1 2, , , , 0
TA A B B Q Q= ≥  and thus we have symmetry among them. The constants 2 2,A B
M M
  represent the explicit 
coupling between the subsystem of player i and the subsystems and controls of the other players. We are thus faced 
with a many player game problem for which the Nash equilibrium will be sought. The multitude M of the players 
will be considered as a given constant. Our main objective is to derive the solutions and study the resulting behavior 
in terms of both state and costs as M grows towards infinity. 
The solution concept that we will employ is the Nash equilibrium where the players use linear strategies in the 
current state 1 2( , ,... )Mx x x x= and Dynamic Programming holds  (i.e. Linear Feedback Strategies in the parlance of 
the literature Refs 1-4). 
Definition 1 A set of linear strategies * * , 1,2...,i iu L x i M= = , (where the * * *1 2, ,..., ML L L  are constant m n× matrices), 
are said to be in Nash Equilibrium if for any initial condition 1 2(0) ( (0), (0),... (0))Mx x x x= all 
the * * * * * *1 2 1 1( , ,..., , , ,..., ), 1,2,...,i i i i MJ u u u u u u i M− + =  are finite and 
* * * * * * * * * * *
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1( , ,..., , , ,..., ) ( , ,..., , , ..., ),i i i i M i i i i MJ u u u u u u J u u u u u u− + − +≤ for any other iu , 1,2,...,i M=  
(equivalently: for any other iL ). 
 
The finiteness of the costs can be warranted by assuming that the closed loop system is asymptotically stable i.e. the 
closed loop matrix has all its eigenvalues in the open left-hand plane. 
Definition 2 A set of linear strategies * * , 1,2...,i iu L x i M= = , (where the * * *1 2, ,..., ML L L  are constant m n× matrices), 
are said to be in an ( , (0))M xε -Nash Equilibrium if for any initial condition 1 2(0) ( (0), (0),... (0))Mx x x x= all 
the * * * * * *1 2 1 1( , ,..., , , ,..., ), 1,2,...,i i i i MJ u u u u u u i M− + =  are finite and 
* * * * * * * * * * *
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1( , ,..., , , ,..., ) ( , ,..., , , ..., ) ( , (0)),i i i i M i i i i MJ u u u u u u J u u u u u u M xε− + − +≤ + for any other iu , 1,2,...,i M=  
(equivalently: for any other iL ). 
Clearly the notion of ( , (0))M xε -Nash Equilibrium is of interest if the ( , (0))M xε  is small and its magnitude can 
be qualified in terms of its arguments, see Comment 6. 
 
 3 
The reasons for the choice of this type of Nash equilibrium are several. We know that in the corresponding 
deterministic discrete time framework, many and perhaps nonlinear strategies may exist; but if we introduce some 
nondegenerate noise in the state equation, then only the linear ones survive (Markov or Perfect equilibria, Refs 1,2). 
In the continuous time case, a similar phenomenon appears as regularization due to noise, of the system of the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations that characterize (as sufficient conditions) the Nash closed loop no memory 
solutions in the deterministic case.  
 
3. NASH SOLUTION 
 
The Nash solution for each player i is sought in the form (3), i.e. restrict ourselves to Symmetric Linear Strategies. 
(It is known that for the infinite time problem considered here,there might exist nonsymmetric strategies. The 
reason we consider symmetric ones is because our game is symmetric in the way the state equations and the costs 
are described. In addition, if one were to consider Linear Feedback Strategies for the finite horizon case i.e. the 
integrals in (2) were from 0 to a finite T, then the Linear Feedback Strategies –if they existed-they would have to be 
symmetric, as an inspection of the associated Ricatti –type equations would show). 
1 2i iu L x L z= +                                                                                                                                                           (3)              
where we set:   
 1 2
1 ( ... )Mz x x xM= + + +                                                                                                                                        (4) 
 The 1 2( ), ( )L m n L m n× ×  are constant matrices. This form is due to the symmetry of the state equation and the 
costs. The constants 1 2,L L  can be determined from the system of the M coupled Riccati-type equations that 
characterize the Nash solution at hand (Refs 1,3,4). Another but equivalent way of determining them is the 
following: Let us consider the problem faced by player 1.He sees the state equations (1) for 1,2,...i M= , i.e.: 
1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2( ... ) ( ... )M M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                         (5.1)       
2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ... ) ( ... )M M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                         (5.2) 
3 2 2
1 3 1 2 1 3 1 2( ... ) ( ... )M M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                         (5.3) 
  .                                                                                                                                                                               .  
  .                                                                                                                                                                               . 
  .                                                                                                                                                                               . 
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2( ... ) ( ... )M M M M M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                    (5.M) 
where he considers in  (5.1)-(5.M): 
1 2i iu L x L z= + ,   for 1, 2,3,...i i M≠ =                                                                                                                   (6) 
Adding up (5.1)-(5.M) yields: 
1 2
1 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
( ... ) ( ... )
( ... ) ( ... )
( ... )
( )( ... ) ( )( ... )
M
M
M M
M
M M
d x x x A x x x
dt
A x x x B u u u
B u u u
A A x x x B B u u u
+ + +
= + + + +
+ + + + + + + + +
+ + + + =
= + + + + + + + + +
  
or                                                                                   
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1 2 1 2 1 2
1( ) ( ) ( ... )M
dz A A z B B u u u
dt M
= + + + + + +                                                                                                      (7) 
Adding up the equations (6) for 2,3,...i M= , yields: 
 
2 3 1 2 3 2
1 1 2
1 1 1 2
... ( ... ) ( 1)
( ) ( 1)
[ ( 1) ]
M Mu u u L x x x M L z
L Mz x M L z
L x ML M L z
+ + + = + + + + − =
= − + − =
= − + + −
                                         (8) 
  
Substituting 2 3 ... Mu u u+ + +  from (8) into (5.1) yields: 
1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2
2 2
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1
( ... ) ( ... )
( ) ( ... )
( ) { [ ( 1) ] }
1( ) ( ) ( )
M M
M
dx A BA x x x x B u u u u
dt M M
B BA x A z B u u u
M M
B BA x A z B u L x ML M L z
M M
B M BA L x A B L B L z B u
M M M
= + + + + + + + + + =
= + + + + + + =
= + + + + − + + − =
−
= − + + + + + =
 
 
 Substituting 2 3 ... Mu u u+ + +  from (8) into (7) yields 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1( ) ( ) ( ... )
1 1( ) ( ) ( ) { [ ( 1) ] }
1 1 1( ) [ ( )( )] ( )
M
dz A A z B B u u u
dt M
A A z B B u B B L x ML M L z
M M
MB B L x A A B B L L z B B u
M M M
= + + + + + + =
= + + + + + − + + − =
−
= − + + + + + + + +
 
                                                                                                   
or                                                
1 1
1
x xd A Bu
z zdt
   
= +   
   
                                                                                                                                          (9) 
Where 
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[ ]
1 2 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 2 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
( (1 ) )
( ) ( )( (1 ) )
0 ( )
0 0 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
0
0
A B wL A B L w L
A
B B wL A A B B L w L
A A B L L B L B L
w
A A B B L L B B L B B L
A A B B
L L w
A A B B B
− + + − 
= = − + + + + + − 
+ − −     
= + + =     + + + − + − +     
   
= + + −   + +   
[ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 2
1 2
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
0
0 0
L L
B
A A B BI
L L w L L
A A B B B BI
 
= + 
      
= + − =      + + +      
                                                (10)               
1 2
1 2( )
B B w
B
B B w
+ 
=  + 
 
1
w
M
=                                                                                                                                                                 (11) 
It is clear now that the problem of player 1 is to minimize his cost subject to the equations (9).The reason is that the 
state 1x and the cost 1J of the player 1 are influenced by 1x , 1u  and z  on which z  the  total influence of  1u  is 
through (7).The solution is 
 given by the formula: 
     1 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) iT T
x
u B B w B B w K
z
 
 = − + +   
 
                                                                                                    (12)                                           
Where  
1
2
T
K K
K
K K
 
=  
 
                                                                                                                                                  (13) 
is the solution of the matrix Ricatti equation: 
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
0
0 ( ) ( ) ,( ) 0 0
T T TB B w QKA A K Q K B B w B B w K Q
B B w
+   
 = + + − + + =    +   
 
                                            (14)                                                             
The 1 2,L L   that are present in the Ricatti equation (14), through the matrix A of (10) are to be identified with  
   [ ]1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( )T TL L B B w B B w K = − + +                                                                                                     (15)                 
 
Substituting in (10) the 1 2, ,L L  by their equals using (15) we obtain for A  the equivalent form (16) that we denote 
by ( , )A K w  in order to emphasize the dependence on K  and w :  
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[ ] [ ]1 2 2 21 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 2
1 2 1 2
0( , )
0 0
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
0
T T T T
A A B BI
A K w L L w L L
A A B B B BI
A A B BI
B B w B B w K w B B w B B w K
A A B B B BI
A A B
A A B B
      
= + − =      + + +      
      
   = − + + + + +         + + +      
  
= − + +  
2
1 2 1 2
1 2
2 22
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
0 0
0 ( )
0 0
0 ( )
T T T
T T T
BI I
B K w B B B K
B BI I
B B
w B K w B B B K
B B B B
     
   − + +         +     
   
   + + +      + +   
          
(16)                    
 
 
It is this ( , )A K w  of (16) that is used in (14). Notice that (14) has several quadratic terms in K  besides the last one 
appearing in (14), since ( , )A K w  itself is a linear function of K .The solution of (14) if it exists, is a function ( )K w  
which has the value (0)K  for 0w = . Since we are going to let M →∞ , we will study the behavior of the Ricatti 
equation (14) by allowing w  to be a continuous variable close to 0. 
 
Let us set:    
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( )( )
T T TB B wR K w KA K w A K w K Q K B B w B B w K
B B w
+ 
 = + + − + +   + 

                                 (17)                    
The function ( , )R K w  is analytic in its arguments. Let us set 
 
2
0 1 2( ) ...K w K K w K w= + + +                                                                                                                             (18)                            
We plug 20 1 2( ) ...K w K K w K w= + + + in (17) and group together the terms corresponding to the same powers of w  
to obtain  
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
( ( ), ) ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ( ), ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
T T TB B wR K w w K w K w w K w w K w Q K w B B w B B w K w
B B w
+ 
 = Α + Α + − + + =   + 

 
 
2
0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1( ) ( , ) ( , , ) ... ( , ,..., ) ...n n nR K wR K K w R K K K w R K K K= + + + + +                                                     (19) 
 
Where 
1 2 2 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 1 2 1
00 0( ) { } {...}
0 0( ) 0 0 0
T T
T
T
A A IB B B B
R K K K K Q K K
A A IB B B
      
= − + + −      + +      

                      (20) 
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1 2 2 1
1 0 1 1 0 1
1 2 1 2 1
2
0 1 1 0
1 2
1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0
00( , ) { } {...}
0 0( ) ) 0
0{ 0 } {...}
0
0 0 Quadratic terms of( )
0 0 0 0
T
T
T
T T
T T
A A IB B
R K K K K K
A A IB B B
B I
K B K K
B B I
B B B B
K K K K K
    
= − + +    + +     
   
 − −    +   
   
− − +   
   
                                                  (21)                    
 
Similarly we can derive the formulae for the other 0 1( , ,..., )n nR K K K ’s.  
Let us consider the matrix: 
 
1 2 2 1 1 1
0 0
1 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 12 1 1 1
1 2 2 21 2 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
00 0(0)
0 0( ) ) 0 0 0
00 0
0 0( ) ) 0 0 0
( )
T T
c T
T T
T TT
T T T
A A IB B B B
A K K
A A IB B B
A A K K K KIB B B B
A A K K K KIB B B
A B B K A B B K K B B
      
= − − =      + +      
         
− −         + +         
− − + −
= 1 0
21 2 1 2 1 1 00 ( ) ( )
c c
T
c
A AK
AA A B B B K K
   
=   + − + +   
                                                      (22) 
It holds: 
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1
0 2 2 1 1 1 1
0 2 1
( ) ( )
( )
T
c
T
c
T T
c
c c c
A A B B K
A A A B B B K K
A A B B K K B B K
A A A
= −
= + − + +
= − + −
= −
                                                                                                                      (23) 
Then 
   
[ ]
[ ]
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0
2 1 2 1 2 1 1
( ) 0( ) ..
0 ( ) ( ) 0 0
( ) 0
..
0 ( ) ( ) 0 0
T T T T
T
T
T T T T
T
T T
A B B K A B B K K B B K B B
R K K K Q K K
A A B B B K K
K K A B B K A B B K K B B K B B
K Q K K
K K A A B B B K K
   − − + −
= + + + =   + − + +   
   − − + − 
= + + +     + − + +    


[ ]1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ))
...( ) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ( ))
T T T T
T
T T T T T T
T T
T T T T
K A B B K K A B B K K B B K K A A B B B K K
K A B B K K A B B K K B B K K A A B B B K K
Q K B B K K B B K
K B B K K B B K
=
 − − + − + + − + +
= + + − − + − + + − + + 
 +
+  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             (24) 
 
Let us introduce the operator 0( , )L K X  which is actually the derivative of  ( , )R K w  with respect to K  calculated at 
0w = . For 
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1
2
T
χ χ
χ χ
 
Χ =  
 
                                                                                                                                              (25) 
we define: 
1 2 2 1 1 1
0 0 0
1 2 1 2 1
2 2
0 1 0 1
1 2 1 2
0
1 2 1 1 2
00 0( , ) { } {...}
0 0( ) ) 0 0 0
0 0
0 ( 0 )
0 0
(0) (0)
0 ( ( )
T T
T
T
T T T
T
c
T
A A IB B B B
L K X X K K X
A A IB B B
B BI I
K B X K B X
B B B BI I
XA A X
K B B K B B B
      
= − − + +      + +      
      
   − − =         + +      
= + +
+ +
− 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 01 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
0
22 2 1 2 1 2 1
)( ) 0 ( ( ) )( )
0 ( ( ) )( ) 0 ( ( ) )( )
0 ( ( ) )( )(0)
0 0 ( ( ) )
TT T T
T T T T T T
T T
c c T
T T T T
c
K B B K B B B
K B B K B B B K B B K B B B
A A K B B K B B B
A X
A K B B K B B B
χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ
χ χ
   + + + +
− =   + + + + + +   
+ + +  
= + −   + +   
[ ]
1 2 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
11 0 12 01 1 1 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1
211 0 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
0 ( ( ) )( )
( ) 0 ( ( ) )( )
( , ) ( , )( ( ) )( )
... (( ( ) )( )
T T
T T T
T T
Tc c c
T T T T T
c c c
K B B K B B B x x
K B B K B B B x x
L K X L K XA A A K B B K B B B
LA A A K B B K B B B
χ χ
χ χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ χ
   + + +
− =   + + + +   
 + − + + +
= + = + − + + +  0 22 0, ) ( , )K X L K X
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       (26) 
 
Equivalently, the operator   0( , )L K X  can be written as a “matrix operator” multiplying a “vector”: 
 
11 0 1 1 1 1
12 0 21 1 2 1 1 2 1
22 0 31 1 32 2 2 2 2
( , ) 0 0
( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ) 0
( , ) ( ) ( )
T
c c
T T
c
T
c c
L K X A A
L K X L A A Y B B B
L K X L L A A
χ χ
χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ
 + 
   = + − +  
 +    
            (27) 
which makes the invertibility study of 0( , )L K X  quite transparent.                                              
We can now state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1  
If at 0w =  the equation ( ,0) 0R K =  has a solution 0K , i.e. 0( ,0) 0R K =  and if the operator  0( , )L K X  as a linear 
operator on X  is invertible ,then in some neighborhood of 0w =  the equation ( , ) 0R K w = has a unique solution 
( )K w which is an analytic function of w  and  has an expansion (18), where the 0 1 2, , ,...K K K  are the unique 
solutions of 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 2( ) 0, ( , ) 0, ( , , ) 0,...R K R K K R K K K= = =  
 
Proof 
The proof of this proposition is a straightforward application of the implicit function theorem for analytic functions 
(see Theorem 8.6 inRef.20) and uses the formulae already developed in (17)-(27).                                                                  
● 
 
  It is important to notice that if we want to find the 
n
K ’s for 1n ≥ we have to find the coefficient of the power 
nw in the equation ( ( ), ) 0R K w w = and set it equal to 0,which yields an equation linear in
n
K of the form: 
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0 0 1 1( , ) ( , ,..., )n nL K K F K K K −= ,where the linear operator 0( , )nL K K  is the one defined in (26) and 
0 1 1( , ,..., )nF K K K − is a nonlinear function containing multiplicative terms of its arguments. 
                                                                     
 
Let us now introduce the closed loop matrix ( )cA w  by the formula: 
 
1 2 2
1 2 1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0 1 2
( ) ( ) ( )( )
T T
c
T T
A A B w
A w A K w B B w B B w K w
A A B B w w
B B w
B B w B B w K w
B B w
−     
 = = − + + +      + + −    
+ 
 − + +   + 
                      (28) 
This is the closed loop matrix of (9) that results when all the players use their optimal strategies and we will have: 
 
( )i ic
x xd A w
z zdt
   
=   
   
                                                                                                                                              (29) 
  
We can now state the second proposition that pertains to the existence of a Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 2 
2.1  If the Ricatti equation ( , ) 0R K w =  has a solution  ( ) 0K w ≥  which yields an asymptotically stable closed loop 
matrix ( )cA w , then the resulting *1u  of (15) and the similar * *2 ,..., Mu u  are in Nash equilibrium. 
2.2  If  the Ricatti equation 0 0( ) 0R K = , where 0 0( )R K is given in (20) has a solution 0 0K ≥ and the matrix (0)cA of 
(22) (or from (28) with 0w = ) is asymptotically stable, and the operator 0( , )L K X is invertible, then for 
M sufficiently large, all the games considered have a Nash equilibrium with asymptotically stable closed loop 
matrices ( )cA w  (which are as in(28))  and tend to (0)cA  as M →∞ .The corresponding ( )K w which determines 
the *iu can be approximated up to order one in w   by 0 1K K w+ ,where 0 1,K K  solve the two equations   
0 0 1 0 1( ) 0, ( , ) 0R K R K K= = . 
2.3 The 1 2,L L  that are calculated by using  (15)  with 0K  and 0w = constitute an ( , (0))M xε -Nash equilibrium. 
 
Proof  
 The proof of this Proposition is an immediate consequence of the previously presented analysis.                          ● 
 
 
Comment 1 
The equation 0 0( ) 0R K =  results in the system: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
0
0 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )
0 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) (
T T
T T T T T T
T T T T T T
T T
K A A K Q K B B K
K A B B K K B B K K A A B B B K K A B B K K K B B K
K A B B K K B B K A B B K K B B K K
K A A B B B K K A A B B B
= + + −
= − + − + + − + + + − +
= − + − + − + −
+ + − + + + + − + 1 2))TK K K+
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Substituting the second one with the sum of the first two we have the following equivalent system that 
1 1 2, ,K K K K+  have to satisfy: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2
0
0 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) )
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
T T
T T
T T T T T T
T T T
K A A K Q K B B K
K K A A A K K K K B B B K K Q
K A B B K K B B K A B B K K B B K K
K A A B B B K K A A B B B K K K
= + + −
= + + + + − + + + +
= − + − + − + −
+ + − + + + + − + +
 
or 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
T TK A A K Q K B B K= + + −                                                                                                                       (30) 
2 1 1 1 2 1
1
0 ( ) ( )T TY A A A Y Y B B B Y Q
K Y K
= + + − + +
= −
                                                                                                      (31) 
2 2 2 2 0 00
T T T
c c c cK A A K K A A K= + + +                                                                                                                    (32) 
 
Where 
1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
0 2 1
( )
T
c
T
c
c c c
A A B B K
A A A B B B Y
A A A
= −
= + − +
= −
                                                                                                                             (33) 
 
It is clear that the gain 1K that multiplies the state ix of player i depends only on his part of the system and cost. The 
Ricatti equation (30) for 1K  is the classical one and the 1K exists and is positive definite under the usual 
assumptions. The gain K that couples the controller of the player 1 with the states of the others may fail to exist 
since its existence depends on the generalized Ricatti (31) .Notice that the study of (31) is reduced equivalently to 
the study of the “Perturbed Hamiltonian” 
 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1
1 1
( )
0 0
T T T
T T
A A B B B A B B A B B
Q A Q A
     + − + − −
Η = = +     − − − −     
                                                                    (34) 
                                                      
If Y satisfies (31), then: 
 
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 2 1
0 0( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 ( )
T T T
T T T T T
T T
T T
I IA A B B B A A B B B Y B B B
Y I Y IQ A Y A A A Y Y B B B Y Q A Y B B B
A A B B B Y B B B
A Y B B B
   + − + + − + − +   
= =      − − − − + − + + − − + +      
 + − + − +
=  − + + 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           (35) 
 
and thus the matrices 1 2 1 2( )TcA A A B B BY= + − +  , 1 1 2 1( ( ) )T TA Y B B B− − + ) have the eigenvalues of H and can be 
calculated by using the corresponding eigenvectors of H , see Ref.19. 
Notice that in order for the Nash game to have a solution we need both  1 2,c cA A  to be asymptotically stable, a fact 
that will hold for 1cA if 1 1,A B  is a controllable pair. The conditions for the asymptotic stability of  2cA  are less 
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obvious and depend on the eigenstructure ofΗ . Actually there are cases where there is no solution resulting in 2cA  
asymptotically stable, or there can be more than one solution that yield 2cA  asymptotically stable which would mean 
correspondingly that we have no or many Nash equilibria. Finally notice that solving for 2K  is a linear problem that 
always has a solution if 2cA is asymptotically stable. Thus the existence of a Nash solution amounts to studying (30) 
and (31) and demanding that both 1 2,c cA A are asymptotically stable.  
 
Comment 2 
The invertibility of 0( , )L K X  is equivalent to having invertibility of the operators: 
 
11 1 1 1 1 1
22 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
33 2 2 2 2 2
( )
( ) ( ( ) )
( )
T
c c
T T T T
c c
T
c c
L A A
L A A B B K B B B K
L A A
χ χ χ
χ χ χ
χ χ χ
= +
= + − − +
= +
                                                                                    (36) 
The first and third one are invertible if 1 2,c cA A are asymptotically stable. It is the invertibility of the second one that 
is the more interesting. Let us look at it more carefully: 
2 1 1 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ( )( ) )
T T T
c
T T T
A A B B B K K
A A B B B K K A K K B B B
χ χ
χ χ
+ − + + =
= + − + + + − + +
                                                           (37) 
This equation involves the matrices 2 1 2 1 2( )TcA A A B B BY= + − +  and 1 1 2 1( ( ) )T TA Y B B B− − +  that appear in (31) 
(or (35)), and  thus we have invertibility of 0( , )L K X if and only if : 
 
2 1 1 1 2 1( ( )( ) )) 0T TceigenvalueA eigenvalue A K K B B B+ − + + ≠                                                                          (38) 
 
Notice also that equation (37) is actually the perturbation of the equation that (31) that gives 1Y K K= + . 
To see that, let us perturb the solution Y of (31) to Y + ∆  to get: 
 
2 1 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( )( ) )
( )
( ( ) ( )) ( ( )( ) ) ( )
T T
T T T T T
T
T T T
Y A A A Y Y B B B Y Q
Y A A A Y Y B B B Y Q A A B B B K K A K K B B B
B B B
A A B B B K K A K K B B B B B B
+ ∆ + + + ∆ − + ∆ + + ∆ + =
= + + − + + + ∆ + − + + + − + + ∆ +
−∆ + ∆ =
= ∆ + − + + + − + + ∆ − ∆ + T∆
 
                                                                                                                                                                       (39) 
 
 
Therefore the condition for invertibility of 0( , )L K X is equivalent to asking that the perturbation of the equation that 
determines 1Y K K= + has no zero eigenvalue. If we demand more than that, namely that all the perturbation 
eigenvalues of the perturbed equation for 1Y K K= +  are negative, i.e.: 
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1( ( ) ( )) ( ( )( ) )) 0T T Teigenvalue A A B B B K K eigenvalue A K K B B B+ − + + + − + + <                           (40) 
or  
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2 1 1 1 2 1( ( )( ) )) 0T TceigenvalueA eigenvalue A K K B B B+ − + + <  
 
this would imply a kind of  stability of the solutions of (31) that is beneficial for any algorithm that solves (31). 
Actually this is equivalent to something more interesting, namely it is equivalent to asking that the infinite time 
solutions, i.e. the *iL  gains, can be approached as stable limits of the gains of the finite time horizon Nash game. 
Such a Nash equilibrium we will call “Stable Nash equilibrium”. (We remind the reader that a solution of the 
infinite horizon problem is not necessarily a limit of the finite horizon solution. In relation to that and the interplay 
between finite time horizon and Infinite Time horizon solutions, seeRefs.17,18, 3, 4). The justification of this claim 
follows. Consider the cost: 
0
1 1( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))
2 2
ft
T T T
i i f f i f i i i iJ x t Q x t x t Qx t u t u t dt= + +∫                                                                                  (41) 
for  some 0fQ ≥ . 
The state equations remain the same and all the transformations in (1)-(12) hold. 
The finite time Ricatti equation yields a time varying solution which satisfies: 
 
( , ) ( ( , ), )dK w t R K w t w
dt
− = ,
0( , )
0 0
f
f
Q
K w t  =  
 
 
Let  
 
1
2
( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , ) ( , )
K w t K w t
K w t
K w t K w t
 
=  
 
 
Assuming 0w =  we see that the following differential equations are obtained : 
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( )T T f f
dK t K t A A K t Q K t B B K t K t Q
dt
− = + + − =                                                                     (42a) 
2 1 1 1 2 1 1
1
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) , ( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )
T T
f
dY t Y t A A A Y t Y t B B B Y t Q Y t
dt
K t Y t K t
− = + + − + + =
= −
                                                          (42b)                                                        
2
2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( ))
T T T T T
c c c c f
T
c
dK t K t A A K t K t A A K t K t B B K t K t
dt
A t A A B B B Y t
− = + + + + =
= + − +
                                         (42c) 
The solution of (42a) goes to the positive definite stabilizing solution of (30) under the usual controllability 
assumptions on  1 1,A B .The differential equation (42b) has as equilibrium point the solution Y of  (31).Linearizing  
(42b) around this Y we get the linearized equation (39), and thus we conclude that the Y is an asymptotically stable 
equilibrium of (42b) if and only if: 2 1 1 1 2 1( ( )( ) )) 0T TceigenvalueA eigenvalue A K K B B B+ − + + < .Therefore, if 
1 0ceigenvalueA <  and 2 0ceigenvalueA <  and 2 1 1 1 2 1( ( )( ) )) 0T TceigenvalueA eigenvalue A K K B B B+ − + + <  
we will have a Nash equilibrium of the infinite horizon LQ game that can be also considered “Stable” in the sense 
that is the limit of  a finite time horizon equilibrium. 
Let us now summarize the material of Comments 2 and 3 in the form of a Proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
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3.1 The Ricatti equation  0 0( ) 0R K =  or equivalently the system (30)-(32) has a solution that results in 
asymptotically stable 1 2,c cA A  if the pair 1 1,A B is  completely controllable and if the equation (31) has a solution 
Y that makes the 2cA  asymptotically stable. This last requirement is equivalent to asking that the H  matrix has n 
negative eigenvalues 1 1, ,..., nλ λ λ whose eigenvectors have their upper n-dimensional parts linearly independent, and 
the other n eigenvalues 1 2 2, ,...,n n nλ λ λ+ +  satisfy: 0, 1,2,..., , 1, 2,...,2i j i n j n n nλ λ− ≠ = = + + .The eigenvectors 
corresponding to 1 1, ,..., nλ λ λ  are used to construct Y (see Ref.19). 
3.2 If the assumption of 3.1 hold and in addition the eigenvalues satisfy: , 1,2,..., , 1, 2,...,2i j i n j n n nλ λ< = = + + , 
then the Nash Equilibrium is a “Stable” one in the sense delineated above. 
 
Proof 
The proof is actually given in Comments 2 and 3. We use the classical construction of Ref.19. As evidenced from 
(37), H  has the eigenvalues  of 2cA and the negative eigenvalues of 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1( )( ) ( )T T T TA K K B B B A Y B B B− + + = − + .          
                                                                                                                                                                                      ● 
  
Comment 3 
The study of H is quite central to the existence and character of the Nash solution and as such it merits independent 
investigation. First of all it is clear from (34) that H is equal to the classical Hamiltonian which corresponds to the 
classical Ricatti (30), and since the eigenvalues are continuous functions of the matrix entries, if we think of 2 2,A B  
as perturbations, then for sufficiently small values of them the assumptions and thus the conclusions of Proposition 
3 hold. Thus it is easy to produce sufficiency nonempty conditions for Proposition 3 to hold. Notice also that H  is 
not Hamiltonian in the sense encountered in the Linear Quadratic Control Theory and the study of the classical 
Ricatti equation, see Refs.3, 4, and 19 and it can be any arbitrary 2 2n n×  matrix as the choices of 1 2 1 2, , ,A A B B  can 
produce any value for the terms they determine in H . The Q  term of H  seems to introduce a restriction since it is 
symmetric and positive semidefinite. Actually any quadratic matrix equation of the form 
11 12 22 21 0H Y YH YH Y H+ + + =  can be transformed to having 21H  symmetric and positive semidefinite by using 
21
TH UDV= the singular value decomposition of 12H ,with D  diagonal and positive semidefinite. Pre- and post- 
multiplying the equation with TU and V  respectively and considering as new unknown the TY U YV= , we have a 
new quadratic matrix equation with symmetric positive semidefinite constant term. Thus the Q  term does not really 
provide any structure and thus the H  matrix we deal with here does not have any particular structure. 
 
Comment 4 
The underlying theme of this work is the presence of very many symmetric players, and therefore the limiting 
behavior as the number of players M grows to infinity is considered. It should be noticed that nowhere did we refer 
to a game with an infinite number of players, or to 0K  as defining the Nash equilibrium strategy of a player in the 
presence of an infinite number of players. Nonetheless if one were to make sense of such a limit per se-as if the 
players are infinite in multitude, the equations (9) are of importance. Notice by the way, that we derived (9) where 
the variable z concatenates the influence of all the other players on player one, and derived then the Nash 
equilibrium, although we could have derived the Nash equilibrium working directly on equations (5.1)-(5. M ).Let 
us look more carefully at equations (9), restated below for convenience. 
If we consider that the 1 2,L L  have values that converge to definite limits as M →∞ , a fact that holds under the 
assumptions of Proposition 2, then the system (9) in the limit M →∞  behaves like: 
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1
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) , T
dx A x A L L z u u B B K x
dt
= + + + + = −                                                                                          (43)                       
1 2 1 2 1 1( ( ) ( ))T
dz A A B B B K K z
dt
= + − + +                                                                                                         (44)                       
Equivalently we can say that player one faces a control problem of minimizing 1J (as in (2)), where his control is 
1u , and his state 1x is influenced by a state variable z  which z  is available to him but is not at all influenced by him:            
The state z  obeys the evolution equation (44) which is not at all influenced by 1x or 1u ,as should be expected, since 
one player on his own should not have any influence on the collective behavior of a infinite number of fellow 
players. The question is whether we can think of the equation (44) as resulting from a control problem with state 
equation:  
1 2 1 2( ) ( )e e e
dz A A z B B u
dt
= + + +                                                                                                                          (45) 
and cost to be minimized 
0
1
min ( ( ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ))
2
T T T
e e e e e e e e eJ z t Q z t u t S z t u t u t dt
∞
= + +∫                                                                            (46) 
which for appropriate choices of eQ  eS , has as solution:  
1 1( ))Te eu B K K z= − +                                                                                                                                           (47) 
(Notice that is a particular case of an “inverse” problem” and such problems have been studied in the past in more 
generality ,see for example:Refs 21,22 ). The state ez  and the control eu , can be thought of as the collective state 
and control of the other infinite in multitude players that determine the behavior of the “market” faced by player 
one.  
Of course it is assumed that: 
0 0
T
Te e
e e e
e
Q S Q S S
S I
 
≥ ⇔ − ≥ 
 
 
The solution of this problem is: 
1 2[( ) ]Te e eu B B S z= − + Ρ +  
where Ρ solves the Ricatti equation: 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 20 ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( )( )T T T T Te e e e eA A B B S A A B B S Q S S B B B B= Ρ + − + + + − + Ρ + − − Ρ + + Ρ  
,e eQ S have to be chosen so that  the optimal control solution (47) has the value  1 1( ))Te eu B K K z= − + , i.e. 
1 2 1 1( ) ( )T TeB B S B K K+ Ρ + = +  
or 
1 1 2( )T TeS B Y B B= − + Ρ  
Substituting eS  with it’s equal from above we get: 
1 2 1 2 1 10 ( ) ( ) ( )T T T TeA A A A Q B Y B Y= Ρ + + + Ρ + −  
Therefore in order that the problem (45)-(46)  has the solution (47), we should choose: 
0, , 0, 0T T Te e e e e eQ Q S Q S S= ≥ − ≥ Ρ = Ρ ≥                                                                                                           (48) 
so that the following hold: 
1 1 2( )T TeS B Y B B= − + Ρ                                                                                                                                      (49) 
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1 2 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0T T T TeQ A A A A B Y B Y= −Ρ + − + Ρ + ≥                                                                                             (50) 
where Y  solves  
2 1 1 1 2 10 ( ) ( )T TY A A A Y Y B B B Y Q= + + − + +                                                                                                       (51) 
These conditions give , ,e eQ S Ρ as functions of the parameters 1 2 1 2, , , ,A A B B Q  and they can always be satisfied as the 
following choice shows: 
10,
T
eP S B Y= = ,  1 1( ) 0T T TeQ B Y B Y= ≥  
With this choice the cost (46) is: 
1 1 1 1
10
( ) ( )1
min ( ) ( )2
T T T T
e e
e T
e e
z t z tY B B Y Y B
J dt
u t u tB Y I
∞     
=     
    
∫  
which results in optimal value 0 since 1 1( ))Te e e eu B K K z S z= − + = −  
 A special possible choice is to have 0eS =  and then finding , eQΡ   may be or not be possible. For example, let 
2 0B = so that we have coupling of the state equations of the players only through the 2A  term. We can take   
0,eS Y= = Ρ , if  
TY Y= , which yields: 
1 2 1 2 1 1( ) ( ) 0T T TeQ Y A A A A Y Y B B Y= − + − + + ≥   
2 1 1 1 1( ) T TQ Y A A A Y YB B Y= − + − +  
or 
2eQ Q A Y= +  
 The case TY Y= can occur for example if 2 2
T TA Y YA= (a fact that cannot be guaranteed a priori) since then the 
equation for Y can be written as  
2 1 2 1 1 1
1 10 ( ) ( )
2 2
T TY A A A A Y Q YB B Y= + + + + −  
and obviously has a symmetric solution. For example if the coupling matrix 2 2A a I=  with 2a  a real scalar, this is 
the case and 2 2eQ Q A Y Q a Y= + = + is acceptable if it is positive semidefinite. 
 
Comment 5 
It would be important to consider whether 1 10, 0,K K≥ ≤ or 1K  indefinite .For example, if it is positive definite, this 
means that as the number of players goes to infinity the cost of each player at the Nash equilibrium is decreasing. 
Let us consider the equation: 
1 0 1( , ) 0R K K =  
which can be written as: 
11 0 1 1 1 1 1 11
12 0 1 21 1 2 1 1 1 2 12
22 0 1 31 1 32 2 2 2 2 22
( , ) 0 0
( , ) ( ) ( ( ) ) 0
( , ) ( ) ( )
T
c c
T T
c
T
c c
L K K A A r
L K K L A A YB B B r
L K K L L A A r
χ χ
χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ
 +   
    = + − + =    
   +      
         (52) 
 
 
Where 
1 1
111 12
1 1 1
212 22
T
K K
K
K K
χ χ
χ χ
   
= =   
  
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11 12 2
0 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 0
12 22 1 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 2
0 0
1 2 1
0 0{ ( ) 0 } {...} ( )
0 0 2
( )
( ) 0
T T T T T T
T T T
T
r r B I I
K B B B K B K B B B K
r r B B I I
B B B B B B B
K K
B B B
−       
     = + + + +            + −      
 + +
+  + 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            (53) 
It holds: 
 
[ ] 211 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 0
1 2
1 2 2 1 1 1 2
0 0
1 2 1
0 0
0 { { ( ) 0 } {...} ( )
0 0 2
( ) } 0
0( ) 0
T T T T T T
T T T
T
B I I
r I K B B B K B K B B B K
B B I I
IB B B B B B B
K K
B B B
−     
     = + + + +          + −    
 + +  
+ =   +   
 
This is easy to prove by just carrying out the multiplication using the right hand side of (53). Therefore to find 111K , 
one has to solve: 
1 1
11 1 1 11 0
T
c cK A A K+ =  
and since we want an asymptotically stable closed loop system it will be that all the eigenvalues of 1cA  are negative, 
and  thus 111 0K = .Therefore the 1K matrix will necessarily have the form 
1
12
1 1 1
12 22
0 K
K
K K
 
=  
 
 
which is indefinite, except if also 112 0K = which is not necessary .We see that  as the number of players goes to 
infinity, the cost of each player does not behave monotonically ,although the part of the cost that depends on his 
initial condition 1(0)x remains constant up a first order of w ,i.e.: 
[ ]
1
1212
1 1 0 1 1
12 22
(0)01( ) (0) (0) ( ( )) (0)2
T xKJ w x z K w O w
zK K
   
≈ + +   
  
                                                                                (54) 
This is not true for the cost of the concatenated player who sees as his state z . 
The case where 112 0K = is worthy examining since it would imply that the cost 1( )J w  behaves monotonically 
in w up to order two. This holds only for very special values of the parameters of the game, and if it were to hold ,it 
would mean that the players have the cost: 
[ ]
2
1 11 2
1 1 0 22
(0) (0)1 1( ) (0) (0) (0) (0) ( )(0) (0)2 2
T Tx xJ w x z K w z K z O w
z z
   
≈ + +   
   
  
where the first order with respect to w change of the cost depends only on the “average” state z  
 
Comment 6 
The ( , (0))M xε of the ( , (0))M xε -Nash Equilibrium defined earlier needs to be further qualified .From the analysis 
for 0 1,K K we see that: 
1 1
1
1 1
(0) (0)
1( , (0)) (0) (0)2
T
M M
i i
x x
M x w K
w x w x
ε
   
   ≈
   
      
∑ ∑
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This makes meaningful the notion of ( , (0))M xε  equilibrium, since for M  very large, or equivalently for 1w
M
=  
very small, the approximate Nash equilibrium approaches the exact one. Notice that if instead of using in (15) 
0K and 0w = for calculating 1 2,L L  we use the 0 1K wK+ ,we are going to have again an ( , (0))M xε -Nash 
equilibrium where we will have a better approximation of order 2w . 
 
Comment 7 
The analysis of the present paper can be easily extended to the case where instead of the costs (2) we have costs of 
the form: 
21
1 2 3
, ,21 220
1 ( 2 2 )
2
T T
i i T T T T
i i i j j i j j k
j i j i j k j i k i
x xQ Q
J u u u S u u S u u S u dt
z zQ Q
∞
≠ ≠ < ≠ ≠
    
= + + + +    
    
∑ ∑ ∑∫  
where the appropriate positive (semi)definiteness assumptions are made. Notice that this form preserves the 
symmetry and thus the solutions are again of the form (3). 
 
4.  A SCALAR EXAMPLE 
 
In the model (1)-(2) we use 1 1 2 1 2, , 1, , , f fA a A a B B b Q q Q q= = = = = = ,all scalars. Each ix  evolves as  
1 1 2 1 2( ... ) ( ... )i i M i M
dx a b
a x x x x u u u u
dt M M
= + + + + + + + + +                                                                       
The cost of the i-th player is given by: 
2 2
0
1 ( )
2i i i
J qx u dt
∞
= +∫                                                                                                                           
The Nash solution for each player i will be of the form:   
[ ] 1 11 2
2 2
1 ,(1 ,ii i
k k k kx
u l x l z bw bw K
k k k kz
    
= + = − + + =    
    
                                                                                                    
Where K is the solution of the matrix Ricatti equation ( , ) 0R K w = , 
                                                                                                   
1 1 1 1 1
0 0
1 1 1 2
( )0 0 1 1 0(0) _
0 0 (1 )( ) 01 0 0 1 0 0c
a a a k a b k k kb
A K K
a a a a b k kb
λ λ
λ
− − + −          
= − = =          + + − + ++            
1 1 2 2 0, ,c c cA A Aλ λ λ= = =   
  The equation 0 0( ) 0R K =  results in the system: 
2
1 1 1
2
1
2
2 1
1
2 0
(1 ) (2 ) 0
2 [ ] 2 [ (1 ) ] 0
k a k q
b y a a y q
k a by k k a a b y
y k k
− + + =
− + + + + =
− − + + − + =
= +
                                                                                  (55) 
The operator  0( , )L K X  can be written as a matrix multiplying a vector: 
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1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 0 0
2 2 ( ( ))( ) ( ( )) (1 ) 0
2 2 2( ( ))( ) 2( ( )) 2 2( ( )) 2
k b k k k b k k a b y
k k k k k k k k k
χ λ χ λ χ
χ λχ λ χ χ χ λ χ
χ λ χ λχ χ χ λ λ χ
       
       Λ = + − + + + = − + + − +       
+ − + + + − + + − + +              
                         
The important quantities are: 
1 1 1
2 1
1
(1 )
(1 )
a k
a a b y
a b y
λ
λ
λ
= −
= + − +
= − +
 
Solving  (55) we have obviously only one acceptable root for 1 0λ <  and two possible roots for 2λ : 
2
1 1 1
2
1 1
k a a q
a qλ
= + +
= − +
 
 
2
1 1
1
2 (2 ) 4 (1 )
, 1
2(1 )
a a a a q b
y k k
b
ε
ε
+ + + + +
= + = = ±
+
                                                                                        (56a)                                                       
2
1
2
2
1
(2 ) 4 (1 )
2
(2 ) 4 (1 )
2
a a a q b
a a a q b
ε
λ
ε
λ
− + + +
=
− − + + +
=
                                                                                                                        (56b) 
For having 2λ  real we need: 
2
1(2 ) 4 (1 ) 0a a q b∆ = + + + ≥   
For the Proposition 1 to hold we need:    1 2 20, 0, 0λ λ λ λ≠ ≠ + ≠  . 
For Proposition 2 to hold we need: 1 2 20, 0, 0λ λ λ λ< < + ≠ .Let us focus on the conditions for Proposition 2                                                          
Case I. For the closed loop system to be asymptotically stable and 0( , )L K X invertible we need: 
1 2 20, 0, 0λ λ λ λ< < + ≠  
The condition 2 0λ λ+ ≠  amounts to 
2
1(2 ) 4 (1 ) 0a a q b∆ = + + + > .We can have two acceptable 2 0,λ < if 
0 a< ∆ < − .We can have only one acceptable 
2
1
2
(2 ) 4 (1 )
2
a a a q b
λ
− + + +
= if 1( ) (1 ) 0a a a q b+ + + >  
 
Case II. For the closed loop system to be asymptotically stable, 0( , )L K X invertible and the Nash solution to be 
“Stable” we need :  
1 2 20, 0, 0λ λ λ λ< < + <  
The condition 2 0λ λ+ <  amounts to 1ε =  and
2
1(2 ) 4 (1 ) 0a a q b∆ = + + + > .Therefore if the solution  
2
1
2
(2 ) 4 (1 )
2
a a a q b
λ
− + + +
=  
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is negative it corresponds to an asymptotically stable closed loop matrix and the corresponding Nash solution is  
“Stable”. If the other  solution for  
2
1
2
(2 ) 4 (1 )
2
a a a q b
λ
+ + + +
=  is also negative, it corresponds to another Nash 
solution that results to an asymptotically stable closed loop matrix, but this Nash solution is not  “Stable”. 
 
According to Comment 4, we examine the problem:  
2 2
0
1
min ( ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) )
2 e e e e e e
J q z t s z t u t u t dt
∞
= + +∫                                                                                                                      
subject to:  
1( ) (1 )e e e
dz
a a z b u
dt
= + + +  
where it must be 2 0e eq s− ≥ and1 0b+ ≠ .It has as solution: 
[(1 ) ]e e eu b s zρ= − + +  
where ρ is the positive solution of the Ricatti equation: 
2 2 2
10 2 ( (1 ) ) (1 )e e ea a b s q s bρ ρ= + − + + − − +  
We want ,e eq s  chosen so that :  1(1 ) eb s k kρ+ + = +  or 
2 2 2
1 1
1
( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( )
1
e e ea a a a b s b q sy k k
b
+ + + − + + + −
= + =
+
 
Recall that 1y k k= +  satisfies (56a). 
 
Equating the two expressions for 1( )k k+  we find: 
2 2 2 2
1 1 2( (1 ) ) (1 ) ( ) (2 ) 4 (1 ) 2e e ea a b s b q s a a a q bε λ+ − + + + − = − + + + + = −  
Notice that the left hand side has minimum value zero (achieved  for 21 ,
1e e e
a a
s q s
b
+
= −
+
) and can achieve any 
positive value for appropriately chosen 2
,
,e e e eq s q s≥ .The right hand side is achieved if  the root 2 0λ <  which will 
happen for the roots that yield an asymptotically stable closed loop matrix i.e. always when we have a Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
In the present paper the limiting behavior of a dynamic Nash game was studied with respect to the number of 
players going to infinity. Similar questions for the discrete time LQ Nash game and for the Stackelberg equilibrium 
can be considered. The stochastic version of the problem studied here can also be considered for the case where the 
strategy iu is linear in the estimate of the average (market) state z and the estimate of the state ix . Of interest would 
be here to examine in the spirit of Ref.5 under what conditions better measurements (for example less measurement 
noise) are beneficial for the finite time horizon cases as the horizon increases and or as well as when the number of 
players does.  
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